The Problems of Heaven: Evil and Free Will

In its simplest form, the famous problem of evil goes as follows:

Premise 1:  If God (an omnipotent, omniscient, and benevolent being) existed, then it would prevent evil.

Premise 2:  Evil occurs.

Conclusion 1:  Therefore, God does not exist.

The primary theological response to this problem is that God allows us to exercise free will (and thus commit and be subjected to evil) because 1.) a world of free beings who experience evil is better than a world with neither free beings nor evil and/or 2.) God desires that we choose to worship him freely.  In short, our free will is so valuable that God would actually have to be less than perfectly benevolent to violate it.

One of the most popular rebuttals to this “resolution” is that it is possible to prevent actions without interfering with free will.  Consider the following example:

Humans cannot simply exercise their free will to fly by flapping their arms.  However, no one argues that this physical impossibility truly interferes with free will.  We understand that free will, if it exists, is contextual:  for any given being, it applies only to those behaviors that the being is able to perform.  Therefore, God could have also taken away some of our other abilities, such that we could not cause the sort of harm of which we are presently capable.

But God need not go so far.  It could have simply made moral actions so pleasurable or immoral actions so displeasurable that we would not choose to do evil, even though we would still have the free will to do so.

This brings us to the second problem of Heaven in this series:

Premise 1:  In Heaven, we either will or will not have free will; there is no third possibility.

Premise 2:  In Heaven, we will be incapable of or unwilling to commit sin.

Conclusion 1:  Therefore, either God will take away our free will or we are capable of acting perfectly even with free will.

Premise 3:  If we are capable of acting perfectly even with free will, then God could have created us in the first place to have free will but not commit evil.

Premise 4:  If God will take away our free will, then it was not important and God could have created us without it in the first place, saving everyone a lot of unnecessary trouble.*

Conclusion 2:  Therefore, the problem of evil is not resolved by an appeal to free will.

*Many theists would also find the loss of free will to be undesirable, further weakening Heaven as an incentive.

Some theists, in an effort to escape the second conclusion, might object to premise 2, which I gleaned from a Biblically supported description of Heaven that I addressed in my previous post.  However, if sin is possible in Heaven, then suffering must be possible as well, which is inconsistent with standard descriptions of Heaven.

It appears that theists are forced to choose between an already shoddy resolution to the problem of evil and a popular conception of Heaven.  Both choices have considerable consequences.

The Problems of Heaven: Happiness, Suffering, and Identity

What is happiness?

Comfort, contentment, physical pleasure, a sense of having fulfilled important goals–these and more are often used as synonyms.  The sort of happiness that we value most varies from one individual to another.

How does one achieve happiness?

Maintaining good health, eliminating desires, enjoying food or having sex, excelling in one’s career or raising a child or helping others–these methods and more are often used to become happy.  How we find the sort of happiness that we value most varies from one individual to another.

In short:  we all differ not only in what we value, but also in how we go about obtaining it.

What are we to make of Heaven, then, if it is defined as a place of eternal happiness? 

The Problems of Heaven: Introduction

While some theists say that they follow their deity out of love, duty, or respect for what is good, it is clear that the consequences of belief–particularly where one ends up for eternity–play the largest role in compelling people to believe.  Pamphlets ask if we know that we are going to Heaven.  Preachers warn of the fires of Hell for those who defy God’s will and lament that people do whatever they want when they do not fear God.  Believers are comforted by the idea that they will be rewarded for their “service,” that loved ones live past death in a happy place, and that evil people receive divine justice for their sins.  Pascal’s wager, a long discredited but still popular argument in favor of theism, claims that it is better to be a theist than an atheist precisely because the atheist has no good afterlife to anticipate.

Indeed, without the promise or threat of a particular afterlife, religion would lose most or all of its appeal.  After all, even if religious lifestyles–collections of behaviors–improved our mortal lives, we could simply divorce the behaviors from the belief systems and be just as well off.  We should therefore pay more attention to how religions describe their possible afterlives.

I have already considered a very popular conception of Hell, where people suffer eternally for their bad behavior or lack of belief in a god.  The threat of such an afterlife, to the extent that one accepts it as true, is indeed compelling, but faces problems of theological inconsistency.  Other conceptions of Hell may be more theologically consistent, but are less compelling:  Hell as finite suffering until one is prepared for Heaven (so why bother worrying?), Hell as separation from God (big deal), Hell as death (I won’t care when I’m dead), etc.  Observation seems to confirm this hypothesis:  those forms of religion that think of Hell as eternal suffering tend to use its threat more often and produce more zealous believers, while those forms of religion that think of Hell as something less frightening more often use the prospect of Heaven or some other incentive.  If the doctrine of Hell is either ineffective or nonsensical (which would make it ineffective if the theist cared about consistency), we are left to consider whether or not Heaven is sensible and effective–and thus whether or not religion offers any truly compelling incentive for us to believe.

Unfortunately, Heaven is one of those concepts that benefit from vagueness.  The basic idea of an eternal life of happiness is appealing and flexible enough for anyone to imagine whatever pleases him.  However, as it takes on specific characteristics as a religious doctrine, it can easily alienate people and cease to be an incentive to follow religion.  One man’s bliss may be another’s sorrow.

With a focus on Christianity, I will consider this and related problems in more detail as this series progresses.

Marriage and the State

At the heart of the question of whether or not gay marriage should be recognized by the state are two other questions:  those of the purpose of marriage and the government’s stake in recognizing it.  If a purpose can be identified, then we can settle the issue of gay marriage according to whether or not it achieves that purpose and also consider the value of the government’s involvement in the institution.  If no purpose can be identified, then we have no basis for treating homosexual couples differently than we treat married heterosexual couples–but also no basis for treating married couples of any kind differently than we treat unmarried couples. 

Quick Thoughts 13: The Problem of the Devil’s Power

In many religions is a belief in at least one powerful being who can influence us to do evil, believe falsehoods, and so on.  Let’s call it the Devil.

According to many or all of these same religions, billions of people–the majority of the world’s population–are under the Devil’s influence in a significant way.  Being devoutly religious is no protection; after all, only one of these religions at most can be true.  Such a being is surely to be feared, given its ability to so thoroughly and undetectably misguide us to the point that our well-being for eternity is at stake.

By positing the existence of such a being, however, these religions bring doubt upon themselves.  The Devil, it appears, is clever and powerful enough to create religions that explicitly acknowledge his existence.  How does the Christian know that his own religion is not one of these?  How does the Muslim know that it is not his?  Perhaps the Devil realized that simply causing suffering is a poor way to “gather souls” when he could simply create a religion that, in the names of God and goodness and love, would convince others to join and thus be forever damned.  Indeed, any bit of evidence that a theist could imagine as proof of the existence of the “true God” could be manufactured by the Devil:  from warm, fuzzy feelings to seemingly profound revelations to supposedly answered prayers or exorcisms or faith healing.

The Devil would not be picky about his methods–only about their results.  And religion would be the perfect method for his goal.

Unfortunately, the idea of such a being usually fails to make people question their beliefs and certainty.  It seems that, more than anything, it convinces them of their own righteousness and the need to get other people to join them.

That Devil is a sneaky one.

“God’s Simple Plan of Salvation”

The pastor of a local Baptist church recently made the rounds in my neighborhood, passing out pamphlets to convince others to join his congregation or at least his religion.  Since my wife answered the door, I was not privy to the entire (brief) conversation, but she told me that he was particularly looking for people like us, who don’t attend any church.

Now, I don’t fault Christians for proselytizing; given the supposed stakes and responsibilities of their belief system, it only makes sense.  However, the pamphlet, titled “God’s Simple Plan of Salvation” (a tract that has been around for quite some time), is a perfect example of just how poorly planned that proselytization often is.

Quick Thoughts 12: On Fairness in Taxation

One argument that conservatives make against the progressive tax (or against making it more progressive) is that it is unfair.

But which of these income taxes is the fairest?

A:  Everyone pays 20% of his income.

B:  A progressive tax, e.g. income in the $20k-30k range is taxed at 15% while income in the $60k-80k range is taxed at 25%.

C:  Everyone pays $5000.

Conservatives are more likely than liberals to say that tax A is the fairest.  Liberals are more likely than conservatives to say that tax B is the fairest, though it remains popular with both groups.  There is little to no support for tax C.  Let’s consider the arguments in favor of each:

Argument 1:  Tax A is the fairest because everyone is taxed at the same rate.  (People shouldn’t have to pay at a higher rate just because they make more money.)

Argument 2:  Tax B is the fairest because people pay roughly according to their ability to do so.  (People should pay at a higher rate if they have more money because they are less burdened by taxes.)

Argument 3:  Tax C is the fairest because everyone is taxed exactly the same amount.  (People shouldn’t have to pay more money just because they make more money.)

Each argument offers a compelling reason to consider its tax fair.  Any argument over fairness seems to have reached a dead end because there are different standards by which we can judge fairness (though the justifications for taxes A and C are quite similar).

The better question is:  What are our needs and how can we pay for them?  If (1) the cost of our needs exceeds our revenue and (2) the only way to increase revenue in present circumstances is to raise taxes on someone, then it makes sense, even if it is not “fair” by some standards, to collect additional revenue from those sources that would be least burdened by tax hikes.  This is (part of) the same reasoning behind preferring Tax A to Tax C, so it is not a big step to understanding the justification for making Tax B more progressive.

Now, if those needs are not really needs or if there are other ways to increase revenue, then conservatives ought to focus on arguing those points.  Arguing about fairness instead is futile if people believe that “fair” taxation will produce worse results than “unfair” taxation on people who can pay more without having to make meaningful sacrifices.